6 June 1944 - 25 July 1944
ORGANISATION
Elements of all three wings of the Corps of Military Police were planned to land with the assault forces on the first and second tides of D-day, They comprised:
• Three Divisional Provost Companies (each of HQ and six sections) whose task was to regulate and control traffic of the assault and follow-up brigades,
• Six Beach Provost companies (each of HQ and four sections) and several traffic Control Sections, which were responsible for control of traffic and signing of routes in the beach transit and assembly areas.
• Ten sections of CMP (VP) who were responsible for guarding PW, detaining suspect civilians and Constructing cages.
• Two Corps Provost Companies who were deployed to control the area between the beaches and the forward divisions.
During the build-up the provost strength in the beach-head increased by the addition of :—
• A provost company for each division phased in after the assault.
• Four provost companies, four TC companies and one VP company for each of the armies.
• Seven provost, seven TC and three VP companies for L of C areas. L of C Provost were phased in earlier than planned, to assist in the main problem of organising traffic.
With the exception of beach provost companies who had more work than four sections could adequately handle, the allotment would have been sufficient had it landed according to plan, but owing to the failure of the Rhinos and the rough sea conditions, only divisional and corps provost companies arrived on time.
The result was that there was no proper supervision of assembly areas on the morning of D+1 and the narrow exits from the beaches were inadequately controlled.
On the afternoon of D+1, when the LSTs were beached and a flood of delayed traffic was released, there was considerable congestion on the beaches and far too few Provost to control it.
By D+2, however, more Provost had landed and the situation was greatly improved.
By D+3, although the volume of traffic was steadily increasing the forward and return routes in the BMA were working satisfactorily. With minor alterations the original‘ traffic circuits were found to be successful.
TRAFFIC
During the subsequent build-up the problem of 'maintaining an easy flow of traffic was complicated because a modern rnechanised army was attempting to manoeuvre on a system of narrow and badly maintained roads which had been designed to carry the slight traffic of an agricultural area. Within a few weeks of landing, the beach-head, which at that time measured only a little more than twenty miles broad and ten miles deep, contained 115,000 vehicles.
At one check post 18,836 vehicles passed by in one day, giving an hourly average of 785 vehicles, or nearly one vehicle every four seconds of the night and day. The policy at this time was to accept any vehicle on the road at any time, and the general object of all concerned was to keep traffic moving at all costs. Despite every effort the towns of COURSEULLES, BERNIERES, LA DELIVRANDE and BAYEUX quickly became bottlenecks.
The problem was eventually partially solved by:
• Building tank tracks, lateral cross country roads and by-passes.
• Instituting a system of movement control. In the absence of a firm plan for traffic control, movement tended to take place during the hours of daylight, leaving the roads relatively free at night, but after the institution of movement control all operational traffic was timed to take place during the hours of darkness, when administrative traffic was less heavy.
SIGNING
Although each provost company carried into the beach-head a reserve of signs and signing material, so that there would be little delay in laying out routes, the task was so tremendous that each company had to resort to improvisation at an early stage.
During the build-up period the congestion of formations, depots and installations in the beach-head produced a confusing multiplicity of signs. To make the system of signing uniform, Provost became responsible for co-ordinating all route signing. Each company set up a sign factory operated in the initial stages by its own personnel but later by Pioneers, civilian carpenters and sign writers.
COMMUNICATIONS
Each corps and army was allotted a CMP (TC) signal section which proved to be invaluable, for by operating their own network of signal communications the police were greatly assisted in their problem of controlling traffic.
CRIME
There was little crime recorded during this phase, but it is difficult to say how far this was due to the fact that everyone was busily occupied and how far to the fact that the time and attention of the Provost was almost entirely taken up with traffic control.
One Special Investigation Section was allotted to Second Army and during the build-up was fully occupied in investigating cases of looting and illegal disposal of WD stores.
26 July-26 September
TRAFFIC CONTROL
With the first signs that a crack in the GERMAN defence was developing, it became apparent that a large-scale advance must be planned for, including the crossing of the SEINE. Therefore, six additional traffic control companies were phased in, all of which arrived before 8 August.
On 21 August, Second Army and First Canadian Army each had four TC coys under command, and seven were under command HQ L of C.
As the length of the pursuit increased, a request was made to the War Office for four more TC coys and six additional (VP) coys. This request was met in October.
There was a big signing problem on each of the four main administrative routes, together with the various roadheads and depots which were opened up as the armies advanced.
The signing of routes within roadheads proved to be one of the most important of provost tasks. Experience showed that one full TC coy is required for the control of a roadhead supplying three corps.
It was found that it was better to have one company permanently allotted for this tasks as the type of signing required was different from that normally employed on main administrative routes.
The best solution was found to be to allot distinctive coloured arrows to each main commodity.
The roadhead TC was responsible for signing to the depots and the depot commander responsible for signing inside his depot.
DISCIPLINE
In the early stages of the advance, a number of reports of looting were received. SIB investigated and found conclusive evidence that GERMANS in retreat had been guilty of most of these crimes. It was arranged that SIB, with representatives of Claims and Hirings, should enter important towns immediately behind forward troops in order to investigate without delay all reports of ill-discipline.
The policing of liberated towns was a major commitment, which increased as the advance continued, and the responsibility for which was taken over by the CMP allotted to L of C.
CHANNEL PORTS
Of the Channel ports that were liberated DIEPPE was the only one to be opened immediately and Provost had to handle large numbers of transit personnel, most of whom were reinforcements.
CRIME IN LIBERATED AREAS
Crime of varying natures began to develop in the liberated areas, particularly in the larger towns. Black market activities increased rapidly, and investigations often showed that WD property was the subject of such dealings.
A number of civilians were apprehended for tapping the petrol pipeline, and others for improper possession of VVD stores. Civilians arrested were handed over to the civil police for disposal. The crossing of the FRENCH-BELGIAN frontier was followed by an outbreak of illegal dealings in the currencies of the two countries, and also by a certain amount of smuggling—particularly tobacco, cosmetics and liquor.
Provost kept close contact with Intelligence, local police and customs officials in dealing with these crimes.
In BRUSSELS and ANTWERP, where large numbers of troops were in contact with large civil populations, Provost were successful in reducing the activities of racketeers ofall types.
The police authorities of both FRANCE and BELGIUM were most friendly and willing to co-operate, but in the case of the former the activities of the GERMAN occupying forces in FRANCE had disorganised them and prevented them immediately reaching their full efficiency.
SPECIAL DUTIES
Military police were included in the escort provided for the Commander of the FFFI on his entry into PARIS, and remained With him for about a fortnight.Two sections of provost were detailed for special duties in connection with the airborne operation at ARNHEM. They were in addition to the Provost forming a normal part of the airborne formations, and were included in what was planned to be the airborne FMA. Although they landed successfully the eventual withdrawal of 1 Airborne Division prevented the full development of the project.
27 September 1944—14 January 1945
During this period the strength of the Provost within 21 Army Group was increased by the addition of four TC coys and six VP coys in October and by another VP coy in December.
Furthermore a special squad of thirty BELGIAN gendarmes was lent by the Commissaire de Police Belge to help in the control of the slow moving civilian traffic which used the main military supply routes.
While all wings of the Provost carried out their routine tasks of patrolling and signing routes, guarding vulnerable points, routing convoys and exercising disciplinary control over military personnel in the whole area occupied by 21 Army Group, the main interest of their work at this time centred around the advance base and BRUSSELS which became the main leave centre.
Provost working in close co-operation with the local police dealt with all problems attendant on the setting up of a leave centre in a city, such as controlling clubs and cafes, countering black market activities, apprehending absentees and investigating the theft of WD vehicles, which at this time were being stolen at an increasing rate.
Action in connection with VD included, in addition to enforcing the order putting brothels out of bounds, the creation of an index of prostitutes.
The smartness, discipline and restraint of troops on leave in the leave centres were matters which were commented on favourably by the local inhabitants.
As the port and supply base of ANTWERP developed, involving a growth in the number of military and civilian personnel employed, there was an increase in pilfering and organised crime which the Provost set out to combat.
A permanent river patrol of port and security police stationed on a specially fitted moored barge, policed the River SCHELDT on fast motor launches and searched at will the craft upon the estuary. These surprise checks often resulted in the apprehension of enemy agents and collaborators as well as in the recovery of stolen WD stores.
At the same time a rigid control was imposed on civilians working at the docks and depots which brought to light a large number of thefts.
The culprits were generally let off very lightly by the civilian courts, for it was the policy to fine offenders even when a term of imprisonment would have been the more appropriate and deterrent punishment.
Military personnel also were concerned in various thefts of foodstuffs, petrol, vehicles, clothing and blankets, which afterwards found their way into the civilian black market.
In one case investigations of the SIB led to the arrest of a gang of deserters masquerading as an authorised military unit.
This gang was organised to the extent of having its own stationery and identity cards printed, for several months drew petrol and rations from army sources, and requisitioned its own cars and billets from unsuspecting civilians.
In mid December when the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES began, the movement of the necessary BRITISH formations to oppose the enemy drive was carried out without radical changes to the existing traffic circuits.
Second Army was responsible for the majority of these moves, but to ensure that there was complete agreement with the Americans a provost officer from HQ 21 Army Group was attached to ADSEC COM Z to act as a channel through which HQ 30 Corps could communicate directly with the AMERICAN Provost and Movement branches.
15 January 1945 - 8 May 1945
In view of the short period between the end of operation BLACKCOCK and the beginning of operation VERITABLE strict traffic control was necessary to move and concentrate the required formations in time.
To achieve this a series of traffic check points was set up at intervals along the routes. Each post was connected by telephone with the Provost and Q(Mov) branches at HQ First Canadian Army, with the result that if any formation did not move to time, immediate notice could be given to Q(Mov), who altered the move of other units accordingly.
This meticulous control was a major contribution in moving 35,000 vehicles in such a short period.
The move into the forward areas North-East of the MAAS immediately prior to the assault, took place during five consecutive nights. Special traffic restrictions were imposed during those nights to ensure that incidental and administrative traffic did not interfere with operational moves and to make certain that all important movement was completed by first light.
To enforce these restrictions the Provost staff was lent the assistance of six hundred personnel of a CANADIAN LAA regiment, who were supplied with TC equipment and given temporary authority as regimental police.
HQ First Canadian Army was kept informed of the progress of the movement and also the state of the roads in the assembly area by a joint 30 Brit Corps and 2 Cdn Corps traffic office which submitted reports on the situation every two hours.
As a result of these arrangements no major delays occurred in the marshalling area for the assault, despite the fact that sudden thaws caused large stretches of the main forward routes to break up and become impassable.
For the duration of operation GOLDFLAKE Provost staff officers from HQ 21 Army Group lived in PARIS with the AMERICAN Transportation and Provost Marshal branches to co-ordinate the traffic control arrangements of the formations concerned.
Since the line of movement from MARSEILLES to CAMBRAI crossed the main US supply routes it was agreed that the US military police would sign the convoy route from the point of disembarkation to the dispersal point at CAMBRAI, but that the marshalling and guiding of the various convoys should be the responsibility of a BRITISH traffic control company.
At a later stage of the operation a L of C provost and a CANADIAN TC coy arrived from ITALY.
The build-up for operation PLUNDER did not present the Provost Service with any particular difficulties. Control of the main bridges at LOTTUM, WELL, GENNEP, VENLO and MOOK was exercised by an army traffic control company, assisted by experienced sections lent from L of C resources.
One traffic control company was allotted to each of 12 and 30 Corps bank control groups for duty in the bank area on both sides of the RHINE. The companies reported to corps early in March for thorough training and briefing. It was found that one company could only provide seventy per cent of the necessary control and consequently the remainder had to be improvised from pioneer or infantry resources.
At the time of the break-out from the RHINE bridgehead, Second Army had seven CMP (TC) coys and three CMP (VP) coys under command, while the Provost strength in First Canadian Army consisted of four CMP (TC) coys and one CMP (VP) coy, leaving a balance of nine CMP (TC) coys and eight CMP(VP) coys in the L of C.
The Provost resources of the two armies were sufficient to meet all requirements in GERMANY and NORTH HOLLAND, but it was necessary to ask for a further CMP (TC) coy and a CMP (VP) coy from UK for the L of C areas in order to carry out all the essential Provost commitments there.
During the advance liaison Provost staff officers of HQ 21 Army Group were attached to both the Ninth and Fifteenth US Armies.
Members of the provost section with Tac HQ, 21 Army Group escorted GERMAN officers through the BRITISH lines during the preliminary negotiations which led up to the final surrender.
The SIB continued to be fully occupied in investigating crimes connected with the disappearance of large quantities of all types of WD property which found their way into the black markets of the liberated countries.
After the entry into GERMANY military police helped in the search for suspects, enemy soldiers in hiding, and fire-arms, and also enforced the Military Government laws and ordinances, especially those relating to looting and curfew restrictions.
Sixty GERMAN civil police (Ordnungspolizei) were attached to the Provost Branch Second Army for a short course of instruction and afterwards assisted provost companies in enforcing law and order.