6 June 1944 - 25 July 1944
MAINTENANCE
For the first four weeks the force was maintained from special packs of stores known as “Landing Reserves” each one comprising approximately 8,000 cases calculated to maintain a brigade group or equivalent formation in ordnance stores for thirty days.
For planning purposes and to allow for losses, delays in off-loading and to ensure adequate reserves to meet possible heavy demands, it was assumed that one of these sets would maintain a brigade for fifteen days only.
The quantity and nature of the stores in each set was based upon experience gained during previous operations and included special sets to maintain such equipment as AVsRE and flails.
From D+26 the force was maintained from Beach Maintenance Packs, similar to LRs, but containing a more comprehensive range of stores sufficient to maintain a division or equivalent formation for thirty days, plus some special packs for the maintenance of particular equipments. One BMP for a division weighed approximately 500 tons and contained some 12,000 cases.
From approximately D+100 onwards, maintenance was to be carried out in the form of Standard Maintenance Packs which included spare parts for heavy artillery, signal and wireless stores, clothing and general stores, sufficient to cover the needs of the force apart from fourth line repairs of vehicles and equipments which were not in any case carried out in the theatre.
The residue of stores from one period of maintenance was used in succeeding periods.
In addition to the stores held by OBDs, all formations ashore were supported by the Ordnance Field Parks who landed complete with spare parts and complete equipments such as guns, small arms, Wireless sets etc. and vehicles for issue to units of their formation. The OFPs were mobile and sited well forward in order that their stocks would be readily accessible to units. Replenishment of stocks of the OFPs was made from the BMA and RMA depots.
Maintenance of the force in ordnance stores was based on the fact that UK would remain the base and that only advanced depots holding a limited range of stores would be located in the theatre of operations. It was realised therefore that not all of the stores required by units would be available from theatre reserves, either because stocks were temporarily depleted or because they did not come within the range of LRs, BMRs or other phased programmes.
To meet such demands a special arrangements was made with UK depots whereby the indents were sent by fast boat or air to an Indent Clearing Centre in UK, whence they were sent to the depots in UK holding the type of stores concerned.
Priority was given by these depots to the despatch of such stores, which were sent to a transit depot in UK for coordination and shipment to this theatre in a small coaster known as the “Ord Ship”. Such stores were handled by a Stores Transit Sub Depot in the AOD who assembled all stores for a formation and arranged direct delivery. In the case of operationally urgent stores fast coaster or aircraft were used to bring the stores over.
ORDNANCE BUILD-UP
The first ordnance units to land on D-day were six OBDs capable of handling all types of ordnance stores, two Independent Ammunition Companies to assist the ammunition sections of the OBDs, two Port Ammunition Detachments and one Port Ordnance Detachment for supervising the unloading of ammunition and stores from the ships.
These units had the task of maintaining the assault troops with stores from the LRs. In the first place however, dumps were established just off the beaches on D-day and D+1, comprised mainly of ammunition, survivors’ kits, blankets and stretchers.
By D+1 reconnaissances were being made of the sites for BMA dumps to be established a few miles inland to hold the LRs and ammunition.
Throughout the campaign all units in the theatre had left in the UK some of their unit equipment not immediately required, thus ensuring full mobility on landing. This remaining equipment was shipped separately as “unaccompanied G1098” which was assembled in ordnance depots on arrival in the theatre and issued to the units concerned.
On D+2 and D+3 detachments of 17 BAD, 17 Vehicle Company of 17 AOD and two Ordnance Maintenance Companies landed to recce sites for permanent depots in what was to become the RMA. Unfortunately the recce party of 17 AOD was torpedoed and almost completely lost but another was organised and landed with the advance party on D+7. The three Stores Companies of 16 AOD also landed with 17 AOD and were merged and operated with the latter.
The site chosen for 17 AOD near VAUX-SUR-AURE proved satisfactory but initial difficulties were experienced because that area was occupied at the same time by two divisions and a tank transporter column. It opened however, for issues on D+26 from BMPs and LRs, the latter having been diverted from OBDs from D+7 onwards. The stormy weather at this period seriously delayed the build-up of ordnance reserves to the extent that by D+23 only 19,139 tons out of the planned 39,240 tons of stores had been landed. Arrangements were made to open OBD stocks in the BMA to OFP and for Ordnance Sub Parks to commence demanding on the AOD.
Final disbandment of the OBDs was carried out at a much later date and the personnel then became available for other duties such as tank kitting sections for corps, staffing Officers’ Shops etc. On the closing down of the OBDs all stocks of their controlled stores were transferred to No. 1 Ordnance Maintenance Company to form an initial army reserve of two days wastage of stores for Second Army. The other ord maint coy (No. 1 Canadian Ord Maint Coy) subsequently became the army roadhead depot for First Canadian Army.
17 Veh Coy brought in their first reserve vehicles on D+7 and set up a vehicle park in the vicinity of 17 AOD. Another vehicle company landed on D+18 with the first of the phased programme vehicles, the drivers then returning to UK to bring over more vehicles.
The first Mobile Laundry and Bath Units landed on D+12. The bath sections of these units operated with forward units, often under shell and mortar fire, providing a change of clothing and baths for the troops. The laundry sections in the early stages of the campaign concentrated on providing clean linen and clothing for hospitals until relieved by base hospital laundries. One MLBU is capable of providing clean underclothing and a bath for every man in a division once per week.
An Army Industrial Gas Unit landed on D+ 18 to produce oxygen and acetylene for workshops, RE Services and medical Units, which helped the shipping problem by reducing the back-loading of empty cylinders to UK for refilling.
On D+22 the recce party of 14 AOD which was to be the main ordnance depot in the RMA landed; it was planned to open the depot in the CAEN area but as this was still in enemy hands and it was necessary to press ahead with the preparation of the depot, it was sited at AUDRIEUX. An immense amount of work was necessary to transform the open countryside into a semi-permanent depot. It was necessary to drain the whole area and then erect 200 steel framed canvas huts. Roads were made and railway spurs run into the depot from the adjacent main line.
During the time 14 AOD was building up its depot and preparing to issue stores from standard maintenance packs, 17 AOD continued to maintain the force from BMPS and the residue of LRS.
AMMUNITION
Ammunition requirements for the force were phased in at special assault rates to replace estimated expenditure until D+3, with reserves calculated at 21 Army Group rates of wastage. Then, both replacement of expenditure and reserves were phased in at 21 Army Group rates until after D+31 when FFC intense rates were used. Initially ammunition was received by the ammunition sections of the OBDs assisted by the ammunition companies under the direction of corps acting through the beach sub areas.
HQ 17 BAD landed on D+5 to co-ordinate the activities of all ammunition depots ashore under the direction of HQ Second Army who assumed administrative responsibility for all stores depots and ammunition depots in the theatre on that day. On D+12, 15 BAD took over the ammunition dump in 104 Beach Sub Area, thus forming the ammunition dump for No. 2 L of C Terminal (No. 2 Army roadhead) leaving 17 BAD free to take over the two ammunition dumps in 101 and 102 Beach Sub Areas, thereby forming the ammunition dump for No. 1 L of C Terminal (No. 1 Army roadhead). 12 BAD landed on D+18 and was sited adjacent to 15 BAD but did not open for issues until D+32 owing to the fact that operational troops were located within the BAD area.
All ammunition dumps in the bridgehead were laid out in accordance with the “User Type Principle” which was found to be most satisfactory, and speeded up the handover of ammunition to formations and units when collecting ammunition. Briefliy this principle involved dividing dumps into areas each capable of holding ten to twenty thousand tons. These areas were then subdivided into the following groups :-
Group 1 - AA ammunition
Group 2 - Fd arty ammunition
Group 3 - Tk and A.TK ammunition
Group 4 - Med and hy arty ammunition
Group 5 - Inf ammunition
Group 6 - Demolitions and associated RE stores.
Very little ammunition was lost due to enemy action except for a total of about 400 tons in the 101 Sub Area dump hit by shell fire during June.
Very heavy tonnages were handled by all ammunition units in the bridgehead. On D-day alone, 6,500 tons were landed and during the first ten days over 80,000 tons were landed to say nothing of heavy issues being handled at the same time. The average daily tonnage handled by the two BADs during the first two months of the campaign was 8,230, the peak day being 16,600, in comparison with the figure of 2,000 tons per day normally expected to be handled by a BAD. The maximum tonnage held at any one time during this period was 125,765 tons. Extensive use was made of pioneer companies in handling this enormous tonnage.
26 July-26 September
ORDNANCE BUILD-UP
On 16 August 14 Forward Trailer Section opened for issue at ST MARTINS in the RMA. This unit had been specially stocked to supply MT spares to L of C units who lacked the Ordnance field Parks of formations.
17 AOD relieved of this load was then able to concentrate on supplying the fighting formations.
14 FTS consisted of forty-one four-ton trailers fitted with bins to carry small MT spare parts and sixty-nine bulk trailers for larger components viz. engines, axles etc. Although it was potentially a mobile unit it was not necessary to move it from the original site until a major move was made in September to the area of BRUSSELS.
Meanwhile 14 AOD was being rapidly developed and in order that it could open on 14 September, the target date, extensive use was made of Pioneers, civilian labour and prisoners of war. The planned figure for the initial stocking of 14 AOD was twenty-three thousand tons of all types of stores but owing to the delays in shipping actual receipts fell short of this figure by some five thousand tons.
A school of instruction was set up to train civilians in ordnance procedure, and what must have been the first passenger train service in liberated EUROPE was initiated for the benefit of 14 AOD to convey their civilians from CAEN to AUDRIEUX.
17 AOD closed down as an issuing depot and its remaining stock of BMPs LRs and other stores were placed under the control of CO0, 14 AOD. The personnel of 16 AOD who were operating with 17 AOD were transferred to 14 AOD and the depot became known as .14/16 AOD.
During this period one base laundry, three base hospital laundries, one base industrial gas unit, four army industrial gas units, twenty-one BRITISH and six CANADIAN mobile laundry and bath units, seventeen port ordnance detachments and fourteen port ammunition detachments arrived in the theatre ready to operate in the advance base and the Channel ports as soon as they were liberated.
At the end of August personnel of 15 AOD arrived in the theatre and later, after the capture of ANTWERP, moved forward from the RMA to recce sites for an advanced base ordnance depot in BELGIUM.
In order to shorten the L of C 17 Stores Transit Depot moved to DIEPPE on 17 September to receive detail issue stores from the UK main base depots for the armies and L of C.
EQUIPMENT
There were no major problems concerning the maintenance of formations during the period in the bridgehead, as distances were short and it was therefore possible to obtain urgent requirements within a few hours dependent upon the availability of stores at the depots and field parks.
Certain difficulties, however, were experienced in the supply of particular equipment, notably artillery, due to mechanical defects appearing after sustained action and prematures of ammunition, but these were overcome by obtaining urgent replacements and spares by air from UK.
A programme for the re-organisation of field artillery in the assault corps was arranged during August. Seven regiments equipped with SP 105 mm guns were converted into 25 pr regiments.
All stores and equipment required for this were brought over from UK together with a detachment of personnel of 15 AOD to set up a special re-organisation park to receive back the old equipment and issue the new.
The equipment rendered surplus by the disbandment of 59 Division and one brigade of 49 Division was received into 14 AOD which opened up special returned stores parks to handle the vast amount of equipment involved. Here the equipment was sorted, repaired and reissued to other units.
Surplus vehicles were received into returned vehicle parks for servicing and re-issue.
MAINTENANCE DURING THE ADVANCE
As distances between formations and the RMA increased, army roadheads moved forward to form dumps of selected fast moving stores readily accessible to the fighting formations, and also to receive stores in transit from the RMA. The supply of stores, however, Was entirely dependent upon the availability of transport.
After the break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead both armies were maintained by road convoys from depots in the RMA to the ordnance maintenance companies at army roadheads.
At the same time a special stores convoy unit to carry forward stores of extreme urgency was formed from 15 FTS, a part of 15 AOD. Subsequently, after the armies had entered BELGIUM, stores were despatched by rail to railhead SOUTH of the SEINE and re—loaded on to rail tail NORTH of the SEINE. This operation was supervised by ordnance railhead detachments.
The distances now separating the armies from the RMA made it necessary to increase the holdings of ordnance stores at army roadheads ; 15 Stores Transit Sub Depot was therefore moved forward to Second Army roadhead to augment No. l Ordnance Maintenance Company.
17 FTS was also moved up to hold an operational reserve of stores well forward in the Second Army area. Similarly, dumps had to be opened for the benefit of those L of C troops who by this time had also moved forward to areas considerably distant from the RMA.
VEHICLE PARKS
Owing to the very limited space in the RMA, as many as three or four vehicle parks were operating on the same site although independently of each other. Throughout the campaign army vehicle parks moved up in support of their formations and other vehicle parks were located at points along the L of C to control vehicles being ferried to armies.
At times a very considerable strain was placed on vehicle parks during the advance so that it was necessary to employ all available drivers, including military reinforcements and civilians to ensure that advanced parks were constantly stocked with vehicles for onward delivery to the armies.
Vehicles from UK were diverted to the Channel ports as soon as they were opened and 15 and 17 Transit Vehicle Parks were established at OSTEND and BOULOGNE respectively.
With the setting up of the advance base in BELGIUM approximately eight thousand light “A” and “B” vehicles had to be brought up from the RMA and to assist in this heavy commitment No.1 Canadian Vehicle Company was brought over from the UK in September.
AMMUNITION
It was found necessary to establish intermediate ammunition dumps along the line of advance in addition to maintaining dumps already in the army roadheads. These dumps were initially replenished from the RMA but as soon as DIEPPE was operative 3 BAD moved forward to receive ammunition through that port for First Canadian Army.
Nevertheless, ammunition still had to be obtained from the RMA and any surpluses that First Canadian Army had were handed over to Second Army.
Although the expenditure of artillery ammunition during the advance was comparatively low, heavy demands were made on arrival in the BRUSSELS area for replenishment of AFV natures and SAA.
Artillery natures were in short supply in the forward areas and formations were restricted to drawing half 21 Army Group rates per day. It was necessary at one stage to despatch 112,000 rounds of 25-pr by air from UK but the situation was improved by the discovery of 80,000 25-pr HE shell (without cartridges) at LOUVAIN which had been excellently maintained by the GERMANS since 1940.
27 September 1944—14 January 1945
Until the establishment of the advance base in BELGIUM 14 AOD in the RMA continued as the main depot for the force with the exception of stores shipped from UK to OSTEND for issue direct to armies and forward L of C troops. Such stores were handled by 17 STD which moved for this purpose from DIEPPE to OSTEND during October.
Special consignments of bulk clothing, soap and other expendable stores were also sent there for issue to formations. Late in September 14 FTS moved from the RMA to BRUSSELS to handle the supply of MT spare parts to L of C troops in that area.
Having reconnoitred a good site in ANTWERP with excellent storage facilities and efficient road and rail communications, 15 AOD immediately commenced preparations for opening their depot as early as possible in the New Year. Personnel of 17 AOD arrived in ANTWERP on 30 October to assist in this and approximately 10,000 civilians were also employed. As the port was not yet open initial stocks had to be brought in through the Channel ports and moved up by road and rail.
BOULOGNE, DIEPPE and OSTEND were each used for a particular type of store in order to facilitate sorting and despatch. Up to the time of the opening of ANTWERP 58,000 tons of stores were shipped through these ports. In the meantime items that previous experience had shown to be in constant demand were forwarded in bulk from 14 AOD to 15 AOD. So that the newly formed depot should not be congested it was at one time necessary temporarily to stop these transfers from the RMA owing to the large volume of imports arriving direct but controlled stores such as guns and wireless sets continued to be moved up and urgent issues of them were made by 15 AOD before the depot officially opened.
By 1 January First Canadian Army became based on 15 AOD, followed by Second Army on 10 January.
In order to handle the large quantities of stores handed in by units when the advance slowed down a RSD was established in a very suitable site fitted with boot and clothing repair machinery at BRUSSELS. At the same time local manufacture and repair of ordnance stores by BELGIAN civilian firms was organised. By requisitioning local commercial factories during October and placing contracts with them for the production of gas it was possible to cease importing industrial gases from UK.
Early in October the use of LE HAVRE for the importation of vehicles was considered, but after several reconnaissances had been carried out it was found to be impracticable owing to the US forces needs in the port area. This port, although not shortening the L of C to any appreciable extent, afforded better unloading facilities than the RMA.
Towards the end of October however the Channel ports were available and vehicles were received through them thus shortening the distance to army vehicle parks. Vehicle companies continued to move forward from the RMA to open new parks in the advance base area thereby easing the task of maintaining an even flow of vehicles to the armies.
The inability of divisional laundries to wash bulky items such as blankets coupled with the presence of convalescent depots, reinforcement camps and hospitals in the army areas made it essential for extensive laundry services to be provided there if the long haul back to the RMA where such facilities existed, was to be avoided.
Accordingly it was decided that a base laundry should be sited in Second Army Troops area to serve both armies.
A base hospital laundry was then sited in the OSTEND hospital area while another moved to BRUSSELS in order to assist 17 RSD. Two hundred civilian laundries were placed under contract during this phase to serve troops on the L of C in BELGIUM.
2 BAD was the first ammunition depot to arrive in the advance base, opening near BRUSSELS at the beginning of October. Owing to limited port facilities and the diversion of most road and rail traffic from the RMA and ports direct to army roadheads the stocking of this depot was necessarily slow at first. However, on the opening of ANTWERP and when the army roadheads had reached their targets of stocks to be held, 2 BAD was rapidly built up to a maximum holding of 75,000 tons.
Early in November 3 BAD, which had been serving as an advance ammunition depot at DIEPPE for First Canadian Army, was moved forward to the area of OSTEND. At the end of December 17 BAD opened in the advance base just NORTH of ANTWERP but owing to attacks by V weapons and the limitation that had to be placed on the use of ANTWERP as an ammunition port, it was not possible initially to develop it to any large extent.
The clothing and equipping of allied liberated manpower units was dealt with by bringing over the initial equipment for these units from the UK and later by setting up a special section in 15 AOD to make issues to the units concerned.
15 January 1945 - 8 May 1945
15 AOD continued to build up stocks despite the serious handicap of V weapon attacks. On 22 January it became responsible for supplying all units not previously based on it e.g. GHQ and L of C units.
As the number of AA units opposing the V weapons increased in the advance base an AA ordnance depot staffed by specially trained personnel from the UK was opened in conjunction with 14 FTS to hold equipment such as radar and spare parts which were peculiar to these units.
As the AA units were also based on 14 FTS for MT spare parts the siting of these two depots together proved most convenient. Towards the end of the campaign many of these AA units were disbanded or re-organised for other roles and a disused airfield adjacent to 15 AOD was used to accommodate the larger stores and equipment made surplus, while the remainder were returned to the normal RSDs of the AOD.
To enable 15 AOD to bring over replenishment stocks from UK more quickly to meet expected urgent demands the “Ord Ship” capacity was increased to three hundred tons a day from 21 February. This obviated the difficulty of forecasting demands several weeks in advance as was necessary with the normal shipping programme.
The increases in the tonnages of stores handled by 15 AOD from the beginning of the year to the end of the campaign are illustrated by the following figures :—
| RECEIPTS-TONS | ISSUES-TONS | |
| January | 36,543 | 18,010 |
| February | 43,028 | 20,067 |
| March | 47,236 | 32,378 |
| April | 49,801 | 32,191 |
| May 1—8 | 12,160 | 11,902 |
During March the load of items demanded reached a new peak of 18,000 items per day.
A gas producing detachment attached to 15 AOD produced inert gas for flame-throwing equipment which was much in use during the fighting between the MAAS and the RHINE.
Unfortunately a V-2 bomb made a direct hit on it, completely destroying the plant and killing all the senior NCOs. However, by improvising equipment borrowed from the RAF and by obtaining additional plant from the UK the unit was in operation again in ten days.
The first officers’ shop in the advance base opened at BRUSSELS in excellent premises. The turnover for the first day was £3,000 and there after the weekly average remained at approximately £5,000.
Ten static shops opened in BELGIUM and HOLLAND at leave centres and towns where there were large concentrations of troops. These produced a turnover of £20,000 a week. The armies were supplied through mobile officers’ shops on the basis of one to each corps, but as they operated from vehicles the range and quantity of the stores they held was necessarily limited.
Good use was made of the industrial capacity of BELGIUM for repairing stores and clothing returned by units.
In March 21,000 tons of general stores and clothing were received, sorted, repaired and re-issued by 17 RSD with the aid of civilian contractors.
Approximately 30,000 pairs of boots a month were also repaired and in some cases rebuilt by this unit.
The increasing number of allied liberated manpower units being formed necessitated the expansion of returned stores facilities as, although initial equipment was being obtained from UK for these units, subsequent maintenance had to be provided from theatre resources.
This would not have been possible without using repaired clothing and equipment, as stocks of new clothing were only sufficient to meet the normal requirements of the force, making it impossible to issue other than part-worn clothing to the bulk of allied liberated manpower units.
On 15 February Ordnance assumed responsibility for holding CA ordnance stores in the advance base. However, this entailed little change in procedure or method of supply and the forward holdings with armies continued to be handled by CA/Mil Gov.
The arrival in the theatre of formations from ITALY during GOLDFLAKE involved a large re-equipment programme.
Security considerations made this task difficult but it was successfully accomplished by liaison with the Ordnance representatives of the formations concerned. Arrangements were made to earmark and ship the required stores, ammunition and vehicles from the UK before the arrival of the units.
Staging camps on the route from MARSEILLES to BELGIUM had to be equipped and accommodation stores provided.
To meet this commitment additional quantities of stores were shipped from UK, while stocks of tentage from the RMA were also utilised. Contracts were placed in LILLE and throughout BELGIUM for the repair of tentage to assist the military repair programme.
Shipments of“A” and “B” vehicles for GOLDFLAKE formations commenced to arrive at MARSEILLES on 20 February and as only fifty drivers accompanied the first arrivals a detachment of 141 Vehicle Park was despatched there direct from the RMA to establish a receipt park.
This unit was eventually relieved by a vehicle park from ITALY. A vehicle company was formed from reinforcements in the UK and BLA and quickly despatched to MARSEILLES by air and rail to ferry the vehicles to the advance base on a seven-day turnround, return trips of the drivers being made by air.
Al together approximately 3,271“B” vehicles and 667 “A” vehicles were received. Many of the “A” vehicles were in need of overhaul and modification before use in the theatre and as this additional task was beyond the resources of REME in the theatre, arrangements were made to evacuate them to UK. However, this problem had been foreseen and stocks of “A” vehicles had already been increased to meet it.
In January No. 3 Field Ammunition Repair Factory moved from the RMA to the advance base,leaving behind some 2,500 tons of “doubtful” ammunition which was later also cleared to the advance base.
After the final clearance of ammunition stocks from the RMA, 15 BAD moved up to the advancebase to relieve the pressure of work placed on 2, 3 and 17 BADs by the armies’ requirements for operation PLUNDER.
The ammunition build-up for operation PLUNDER was the largest ever undertaken by Second Army. The stocks required from No. 8 Army Roadhead for the operation were cleared by rail to the ammunition railheads in No. 10 Army Roadhead by 18 March and a maximum of seven trains a day from the advance base were also received.
During the build-up the average tonnage of ammunition receipts and issues handled in the roadhead was 4,470 tons, the highest tonnage in any one day being 9,150 tons on 25 March.
To conceal the preparations for the operation a smoke screen was provided on the WEST bank of the RHINE and a very large number of smoke generators were used for this purpose, completely exhausting all stocks in the advance base so that it was found necessary to comb the AA gun positions in the neighbourhood of ANTWERP to provide the amount required.
Following the break-out from the RHINE bridgehead the reserves of ammunition remaining in No. 10 Army Roadhead proved sufficient to maintain the remainder of Second Army’s operations in GERMANY and stock the two roadheads, Nos. 12 and 14 subsequently formed.
Early in April, 1 and 12 BADs and certain port ammunition detachments and ordnance ammunition companies were disbanded to form Enemy Ammunition
Depot Control Units ready to take over dumps of enemy ammunition uncovered by the advance and during the occupation of GERMANY after fighting had finished.
For operation PLUNDER the units coming under command of Second Army from First Canadian Army had to be re-equipped in a very short space of time. Consequently a special train was arranged to convey controlled stores to Second Army ordnance railhead where they were received within forty-eight hours after the receipt of demands in the advance base.
All formations were fully equipped several days before the commencement of the operation, except for the Comet tanks of 29 Armoured Brigade which were reported operationally unfit owing to defects in the tensioner wheels. Arrangements were made with the War Office to provide new type wheels which were flown to the theatre in first priority air freight direct from the factory. Each day’s consignments were collected under brigade REME arrangements and fitted to the tanks within seven days in time for the operation.
The main body of 6 Airborne Division which had been withdrawn from the theatre was re-equipped for the operation in UK. However, the sea tail had to be re-equipped in the theatre which presented a problem as its special equipment was not normally held in 21 Army Group.
An ordnance sub park for which certain personnel were supplied from the theatre was specially formed in UK to support the divisional ordnance field park and arrived by sea a few days before the operation.
Special packs of airborne equipment were shipped from UK and held in the divisional ordnance field park, the sub park and in 15AOD. These arrangements for the maintenance of the division proved satisfactory.
A detachment of an air packing platoon was flown in from UK to supplement the RASC air transport platoons located at NIVELLES airfield holding pre-packed supplies for emergency maintenance by air. As already stated elsewhere, this was not in fact required during operation PLUNDER.
During February a re-organisation had taken place in the arrangements for receipt of air freight. Hitherto ordnance detachments from ordnance maintenance companies had been placed at receiving airfields but this became unnecessary on the formation of air composite platoons RASC which incorporated Ordnance detachments. After the crossing of the RHINE, Ordnance was again faced with the difficulties of distributing stores to widely dispersed units.
It was therefore decided to ground the stocks of corps ordnance sub parks and other army store holding units in the rear areas. From the transport thus released an Ordnance Convoy Unit was formed to ferry forward stores from army roadheads to corps and divisions.
Vehicles in the army reserve parks were also formed into convoys driven by RASC personnel.
To meet the commitment of providing amenities for the increasing number of liberated ex-PW. DPS and internees of concentration camps, approximately 700 tons of blankets and clothing were flown from the advance base to the forward areas.
MLBUs were also sent forward to provide laundry and bathing facilities including a detachment for the concentration camp at BELSEN.
As a result of the experience gained during the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM, MLBUs were re-organised before operation PLUNDER to enable blankets to be washed in addition to their normal washing capacity. ‘
As the laundries attached to CCSs were not normally fully employed they were withdrawn and attached to corps MLBUs to increase the corps laundry capacity.