The road to freedom

In the photo gallery you can see more than 40 maps of the "Road to Freedom" -The invasion coast -Basic conception of the army plan -Enemy order of battle in the west at 6 june 1944 -Plan for the assault -The mounting of Operation Overlord -The assault and operations o­n D-day of the second British Army -The assault and operations o­n D-day of the First United States Army -The sea passage -Situation at the end of D-day -Linking up the beach heads -Enemy order of battle in West Normandy as at 6 june 1944 -The initial development of the bridgehead (13-18 june) -The capture of Cherbourg -The establishement of the Odon bridgehead -The situation o­n 30 june -Operations of First United States Army (3-18 july) -Capture of Caen -The operations of the Second British Army, west of the Orne (10-18 july) -The operations of the Second British Army, east of the Orne ( 18-12 july) -The break out by the First United States Army (25-july-4 august) -British and Canadian operations (28 july - 4 august) -Operations toward the closing of the "pocket" and mortain counter attack -First Canadian Army Operations Astride the Caen - Falaise road (7-8-august) -The enemy situation in West Normandy and the Falaise pocket as at 18 august -The closing of the Falaise "Pocket" -The advance to the river Seine -Review of the battle of Normandy -The development of the administrative plan -The development of Allied strategy -The crossing of the river Seine 21 Army group -The crossing of the river Seine Twelfth United States Army group -The advance into Belgium and the development of the Broad Fred policy -The advance of Second Army to the Meuse-Escaut Canal -The advance to the Meuse and Rhine. The Battle of Arnhem -Arnhem and the three rivers -Operations to clear the Scheldt estuary and South West Holland -Operations to clear the West Bank of the river Maas (Meuse) 12 oct - 3 dec) -The battle of the Ardenne -The clearance of the Roermond Triangle -The battle of the Rhineland -The Allied Armies close to the Rhine -The battle of the Rhine -The development of Allied operations east of the Rhine -The advance to the Elbe and the drive to the Baltic -The advance of the Allied Armies into Germany -System of command and location of Principal Headquarters in the assault phase -Outline order of battle - 21 Army Groups - for Overlord (initial phase) -The assault technique showing essential element of o­ne brigade group approaching the beach-

THE AIM OF MULBERRY

THE AIM OF MULBERRY As with most good ideas, the origins of MULBERRY are disputed. Disregarding Churchil's claim to have thought of it firsf the most usually accepted story is that, at the end of a long COSSAC meeting at which the difficulties of capturing a port on the 'far shore' were discussed, Commodore John Hughes-Hallet (from the staff of Combined Operations) simply stated that if we can't capture a port "we must fake one with us". The throw-away remark was taken seriously by, among others, the commodore's boss, Mountbatten, who in turn persuaded Churchill. If the problem was huge in scale. it was simple in nature: to provide a sheltered deep-water anchorage within which largo merchant ships could speedily unload onto jetties which responded to the rise and fall of the tide, The engineering solutions, by contrast, were complex and ground-breaking. (Like the idea itself, the origins of the codename 'MULBERRY' are disputed, One theory is that Churchill was amused by the way hls Scottish housekeeper pronounced the name of his ancestor, Marlborough.) The eventual material commitment to MULBLRRY, combined with the mass-construction of landing craft and other engineering commiments connected with NEFI'UNE, pushed British industrial capacity in its very limits. The basic components of the harbours (of which there were to be two) were the 146 concrete caissons, known as PHOENIXES, which were to be sunk along an outer perimeter to act as breakwaters and ensure calm water inside. These items were up to 6000 tons and 200 feet in length. Their construction - by some of the big-name engineering firms which, 40 years later, started work on the Channel Tunnel - required 330.000 cubic yards of concrete and 31.000 tons of steel. When every possible building slip accessible from the sea was already occupied, huge trenches had to be dug out of riverside meadows tor some of these giant blocks. Many of the ether modular items - floating pontoons, roadways and pier heads - were novel and complex. Some of them contained pumping equipment generating plants, crew accommodation and anti-aircraft guns. MULBERRY also consumed the UK's entire stock of ground tackle, which is why the PHOEN1XES, having been delivered to sheltered anchorages, had to be sunk, rather than moored, and subsequently raised before being towed across to France. The importance of MULBERRY harbours goes far beyond the operational issue of how efficacious they were. Until their invention, it was axiomatic that invading armies would need to capture a major, functioning port soon after landing, to replenish those forces already ashore and to sustain the build-up. The Germans' own abortive plan for SEALION in 1940 had been built around this necessity, and it made the task of the would-be defenders relatively clear: deny the invader a major port (or, failing that, wreck it beyond short-term repair) and any successful landing will probably wither on the vine through lack of life-support In 1943-44, the Germans assumed that such a constraint would apply to the expected Allied landing m France, and so planned their defences accordingly. The invaders would need rapidly to grab a port with the capacity of, say, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne or Calais, and so the landings must take place in the near vicinity of at least one such place. The potential pairings of Le Havre and Dieppe, or Boulogne and Calais, were self-suggestive - the more so as they coincided with easy range from airfields in southern England. Meanwhile, having persuaded themselves (wisely or not) that their logistical needs could be met, for an extended time after the landings, by transportable harbours, the Allied planners treed themselves to think in a rather different geographical box from those German staff-officers whose job it was to second-guess their plans. MULBERRY was not conceived directly for the purpose of deception, but by nullifying received wisdom it permitted the Allies to avoid confronting those segments of the 'Atlantic Wall' to which the Germans would, quite rationally, give top priority. lts implicit purpose, Indeed, was to enable an exercise in manoeuvrism of a scale unsurpassed since Hannibal. THE MULBERRY HARBOURS The Allies needed secure sheltered harbour facilities within days of the Normandy landings to supply their advancing forces. The Mulberry Harbours were designed to fill the gap until ports like Cherbourg were captured. How did they erect two harbours, each the size of Dover, in just a few days in wartime when Dover took 7 years in peacetime? Background When it came to ousting the Germans from their entrenched defensive positions along the 'Atlantic Wall,' planners knew that blockading and attack by air would not be sufficient. The Germans would defend their front lines with great vigour and only a large scale landing of men, materials and machines was up to the task. In the crucial days and weeks following the landing the Allies could ill afford any delays in supplying their advancing forces with munitions, provisions, and materials. From intelligence reports it was known that French seaports would be heavily defended by German forces and, in any event, the ports were liable to be disabled in the event of imminent Allied occupation. Planners also drew on the experience at Dieppe when it became clear that heavily defended ports could not be taken without crippling losses. The plans therefore envisaged a need to create secure harbour facilities away from heavily defended ports and close to the landing beaches. The only certainty was that harbour facilities would need to be provided quickly where none existed. Conventional construction techniques required detailed ground and seabed survey information, precise building plans and the assembly of a construction force of thousands..... and all within easy range of enemy aircraft and long range guns. An impossible task under any circumstances but particularly so when the time available for the construction phase was measured in days! After Normandy was chosen as the location for the 2nd front, the decision to design and construct artificial harbours in the relative safety of the UK mainland was agreed but, it must be said, with misgivings especially on the part of some American top brass. The Concept In 1917Churchill drafted detailed plans for the capture of two islands, Borkum and Sylt, which layoffthe Dutch and Danish coasts. He envisaged using a number of flat bottomed barges or caissons measuring 37m x 23m x 12m which would form the basis of an artificial harbour when lowered to the seabed and filled with sand. Events moved on and ChurchilI's proposai was filed away and was never published. In 1941, Hugh lorys Hughes, a quiet unassuming Welshman from North Wales had similar ideas. He was a successful civil engineer living in London when hè submitted plans to the War Office. Their potential value was not recognised until Hughes' brother, a Commander in the Royal Navy, drew the plan to the attention of more senior officers. This intervention brought Hughes and his ideas to the fore. It was to be the beginning of a long association with the Mulberry project. Other accounts credit Professor J D Bernal with similar ideas expanded upon by Brigadier Bruce White who later helped draw up plans for the final design. It is not possible to say that the idea was the property of any one individual no more than the invention of the internal combustion engine can be attributed a single person... but all of the above cast themselves as major players in the story of Mulberry Harbours. Preparations Early in 1941 a new department within the War Office was set up code named 'Transportation 5' (Tn5) under Major General D J McMullen. It had responsibility for port engineering, repairs and maintenance. The Mulberry project and the need to construct sufficient embarkation points on the shores of the UK, soon became its top priorities. Under the command of civil engineer Bruce White their first project was to construct two military ports in the Clyde estuary one of which was the Gare Loch. There were many meetings with the Americans about the options to provide sheltered harbours.... sunken ships, concrete caissons, concrete pontoons, collapsible canvas floating barriers and Pykrete to name but some. There was scepticism on both sides of the Atlantic and some believed that Mulberry was even more fanciful an idea than Pykrete! To overcome the doubters in the ranks of the high powered entourage, accompanying him to an important meeting in Quebec aboard the Queen Mary, Mountbatten called them to a meeting in one of the ship's bathrooms! There they saw a partially filled bath, 40 or so ships made out of newspaper and a Mae West lifebelt. Half the 'fleet' was placed in the bath and the most Junior officer present in the crowded bathroom, Lt Cmd Grant of the RN, was asked to make waves with the back of a brush. In no time the vessels sank. The demonstration was run again this time with the fleet floating inside the Mae West. To the immortal command "More waves please Lieutenant Grant" the heavily braided onlookers saw that all the vessels survived. One USA sceptic, Admiral John Leslie Hal! Jr, US Navy Commander, was scathing of the idea, predicting that the Mulberries would never stand up to the rigours of the English Channel and, in any event, he could unload 1000 LSTs at a time on open beaches... more than enough to supply the advancing Allied forces. His prediction was, at least in part, later proved to be correct in the case of Mulberry A (details below). But the balance of opinion was in favour of the project and approval was given to proceed. The task of progressing the idea was given to Mountbatten's Combined Operations. He soon realised, however, that the resources needed were way beyond those of his command and hè contracted out the operational aspects to the War Department. The Prototypes Three designs were selected tor further evaluation. The first from the War Office was for flexible steel bridges on pontoons of steel or concrete with pier-head units on adjustable legs to take account of the tides. The second from the Admiralty was a flexible floating construction of timber and canvas held together with steel cables and similar in appearance to a Swiss Roll in its stored condition. The third from lorys Hughes envisaged the use of steel bridges to be mounted on concrete caissons and floated to the sites and sunk in position. Initially none were to be protected by breakwaters. The search was on for 'test' beaches with characteristics similar to those off Normandy - flat, sandy, remote and sparsely populated to ensure an effective security cordon. After exhaustive surveys, Wigtown Bay on the Scottish side of the Solway Firth with its nearby harbour of Garlieston, was chosen. The whole area from Garlieston to the Isie of Whithorn (not an island!) was declared off limits to all except local fishermen. Work started on the construction of a military camp at Cairnhead to accommodate the increasing numbers of engineering personnel (Sappers) with an additional 200 men being accommodated in the village hall in Garlieston. The prototypes were constructed at "the Morfa," Conwy in North Wales where over 1000 local and outside labour was drafted in for the purpose. One such was Olef Kerensky the son of a former Russian Prime Minister, who supervised the construction process. With his mother he fled from Leningrad at the age of 10 and entered the UK on a false passport! Raymond Lee was a small boy when hè witnessed the construction of the massive caissons from his home on the other side of the Conwy estuary. The Morfa area was transformed into a huge construction site Hughes' three 'Hippo' caissons were towed to the site in Rigg Bay near Garlieston. Two 'Croc' roadways were attached to the metal bars on the Hippos and various combinations were tested in a variety of weather and tidal conditions including the driving of fully laden vehicles across the roadway. Thetesting proved invaluablesincethebehaviour of the components could be analysed and corrective action taken where necessary. One such problem was that the floating piers did not rise and fall with the tide as predicted but Hughes found a solution in the provision of adjustable spans between the Hippos and the roadway. A more serious problem was the unexpected pitching and yawing of the Hippos causing the attached Croc roadways to buckle. Hughes proposed the construction of Hippos of diminishing size on which the roadways would sit. Hughes' design was not alone in experiencing problems. When the 'Swiss Roll' roadway was tested with a 3 ton tipper truck the roadway sank in under two hours. Adjustments were made but further tests in the open sea confirmed that the heaviest load that could be carried was 7 tons - far below what was necessary for the movement of tanks. The Swiss Roll roadway design was soon abandoned. ChurchilI's memo of 30th May 1942 to Lord Mountbatten: "Piers for use on beaches. They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be mastered. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves." Progress at first was slow as discussions on competing ideas by the many interested parties were considered. Churchill was irritated by the apparent lack of progress and penned a number of increasingly irate messages culminating in the following on the 10 Mar 1943. "This matter is being much neglected. Dilatory experiments with varying types and patterns have resulted in us having nothing. It is now nearly six months since l urged the construction of several miles of pier." Some organisation af changes were made to "get a grip" on the project. These early designs did not envisage protective breakwaters but it became clear that an area of calm water would be required.. In addition to the breakwaters included in the final plans consideration was also give to"bubblebreaker" and "lilo"....the former involved pumping high pressure air along perforated pipelines causing a large volume of compressible air in the sea sufficient to absorb the power of heavy breakers. The latter were large canvas bags extending some 4m below the waves and 3m above. They were inflated to low pressure and operated on a similar basis to the bubble breaker in that they would absorb the power of the waves by altowing the air they contained to be compressed. On conclusion of the tests a final design was decided upon. There would be two harbours each comprising two breakwaters, offshore and flanking, made from hollow ferro-concrete caissons based on Hughs' Hippo designs. To provide extra protection 70 obsolete merchant and navy vessels (block-ships) would be sunk to fill gaps in the protection provided by the caissons. Inside the resultant protective cordons there would be pier-heads connected to the shore by floating steel roadways. See the final design and deployment of Mulberry B at Encyclopaedia Britannica. In view of lorys Hughes' commitment to the project and expertise he was invited by Churchill to serve the project as a consultant. Final Specification Mountbatten's ideal Specification was for a pier a mile long that could withstand gale force winds and be capable of berthing large coasters. To do this the artificial harbours would need to provide sheltered conditions and be larger than the port of Dover which had taken 7 years to build in peacetime! Within the sheltered areas stable floating quays would be located some distance from the beaches to provide sufficient water depth (6.7 meters) for the docking vessels. These quays would be linked to the beaches by floating roadways to allow the discharged goods and equipment to be transported ashore in fleets of lorries. Two harbours would be required - Mulberry A for the USA beaches of Omaha and Utah and Mulberry B for the British and Canadian beaches of Gold, Juno and Sword. The designs would allow for the floating caissons to be secured in place in four days. Each harbour would have a capacity of 7000 tons of vehicles and supplies per day. For security reasons randomly selected codes were used to describe the various components of the two Mulberry Harbours viz.. Breakwaters • Bombardons - floating breakwaters comprising huge, metal, crucifix shaped structures ballasted and firmly anchored in place. They were the outermost barrier and therefore the first line of defence against rough seas. • Phoenexes-146 concrete caissons 60 metres long, 18 metres high and 15metreswidemaking up 9.5 kilometres of breakwater. They were airtight floating cases open at the bottom with air-cocks to lower them to the sea-bed in a controlled fashion. Around 2 million tons of steel and concrete were used in their construction. • Gooseberries - 70 obsolete merchant vessels (block ships) were amassed at Oban on the west coast of Scotland, stripped down, ballasted and primed with explosive scuttling charges The vessels sailed under their own steam and were sunk in 5 locations including the 2 Mulberry harbours. Pierheads • Pierheads were located at the seaward end of the roadways. Each stood on four legs called (Spuds) with a platform that could be raised and lowered with the tide by means of electric winches. 23 were planned for of which 8 were spares. Roadways • Beetles - concrete and steel floats or pontoons to support the roadways. Each capable oftaking the weight of 56 tons + 25 tons (being the weight of a tank). • Whales -16 kilometres of roadways. • Buffer - approach span from the floating roadway to beach. • Rhino - power driven pontoon on which cargo was brought ashore. Intelligence Gathering The success of the operation would depend on accurate and detailed topographical information about the beaches and coastal towns along the French coast. Aerial photographs helped identify likely locations but, to obtain more detailed views, the Government appealed to the public for holiday photographs and postcards of unspecified coastal areas of France. However much more detailed information on the target beaches and their approaches was required. Local conditions such as the composition of the beaches, hidden underwater banks, German defensive obstacles, depth of water, tidal conditions etc would all be taken into account in the planning of the project. The stakes were very high - bad intelligence could jeopardise the whole vast project.... there was no room for error. On New Year's eve 1943, under the leadership of 24 year old Major Logan Scott Bowden of the Royal Engineers, a unit set out in motor torpedo boats to reconnoitre the area around Luc-sur-Mer. They transferred to a hydrographical survey craft and moved closer to shore before Major Logan and Sgt Bruce Ogden-Smith swam to the beaches where they took samples of sand, mud, peat and gravel which they stored in labelled tubes. They were careful notto leave behind any evidence of their visit lest the Germans became alerted to their clandestine activities - much of their lateral movement along the beaches was below the tide mark! Their mission was a total success. A month or so later, this time using a midget submarine for transport (towed part of the way), the area to the west of Port-en-Bessin and Vierville was visited and a few weeks later the Omaha beach area. Two scale models of the landing beaches were prepared using all the information gathered. One was held by the War Department in room 474 of the Great Metropole Hotel in London and a duplicate in the Prime Minister's room in the War Cabinet Offices - two of the most secret rooms in the country. At Cairnryan, just north of Stranraer in south west Scotland, the information gathered about the beaches was used to construct a "life size" reproduction of the beaches. This would allow the planners to assess the effectiveness of the current landing techniques and the movement of men and machinery over the terrain. The Manufacturing Process The scale of the project was enormous and was in danger of over-stretching the capacity of the UK's civil engineering industry. From late summer of 1943 onwards three hundred firms were recruited from around the country employing 40,000 to 45,000 personnel at the peak. Men from trades and backgrounds not associated with the construction industry were drafted in and given crash courses appropriate to their work. Their task was to construct 212 caissons ranging from 1672 tons to 6044 tons, 23 pier-heads and 10 miles offloating roadway. Most of the concrete caissons were manufactured on the River Thames and the River Clyde in some cases using hastily constructed dry docks. The steel "Beetle" floats were assembled in Richborough, Kent, the concrete Beetles at Southsea, Marchward and Southampton and the pier-heads and buffer ramps at the Morfa site Hughes had used for the manufacture of his Hippo caissons. Trials continued to be run in the Garlieston area of the Solway, even during the manufacturing phase, on for example, the buffers. Hughes involvement continued throughout the manufacturing period and beyond. He helped identify Selsey and Dungeness on the south coast of England as ideal places to "park" the completed caissons until needed. There were tensions between the War Office and the Admiralty which sometimes resulted in poor co-operation and bad communications. After earlier allocations of responsibility had failed to resolve matters the War Office was tasked to design the caissons and oversee the development of the pier-heads and piers while the Admiralty were tasked to design and oversee the development of the floating breakwaters. This agreement was later refined to take account of continued Admiralty concerns about the berthing and navigation guides and it was therefore agreed that they would be responsible for the towing all the components across the channel, the layout and positioning of the harbours and the navigational channels and moorings. D-Day + 1 A large number of British and USA tugs were requisitioned to tow the Mulberries from their assembly point near Lee-on-Solent to France. Operation Corncob got underway when the first of the tugs set off on June 4 later to hold their position in mid channel when D-Day was delayed by a day. When the invasion finally got underway most caissons were positioned about 5 miles off the French coast. Responsibility for Mulberry B off Aromanches feil to the No 1 Port Construction and Repair Group. They received orders to sail on June 6 1944 (pm) and by the early hours of June 7, under the command of Lt Col Maïs, markers were in place at high tide level and on higher ground, for alignment purposes, for the first two piers. Elsewhere further out to sea marker buoys for the caissons and block ships were positioned under the command of Lt Col Landsdowne of the RN. This done the block-ships slipped their moorings in Poole harbour and sailed for France on their final voyages. Scuttling them in pre-determined 'overlapping' positions was a tricky operation but essentiai to ensure effective protection against high seas and fast flowing tides. Similar operations were in progress at Mulberry A off Vierville-Saint-Laurent but here the vessels came under heavy enemy fire. The tugs, which had accompanied the vessels, and which were to assist in their final positioning, dispersed earlierthan planned. By a stroke ofgood fortune the 2nd and 3rd block-ships were sunk by the Germans in roughly the correct positions. In all 5 Gooseberries were positioned to provide the best protection for the two Mulberry harbours and for other beach landing points at Utah, Courseulles, 11 k east ofArromanche, and Ouistreham. These breakwaters provided a good measure of protection during and after the construction of the 2 Mulberry harbours and in the other beach locations. The UTAH beach was a major logistical supply base for the Americans up to November '44 thanks to the protection afforded by its 'Goosberry.' The Bombardons were towed out on June 6 to their moorings which had been laid previously by boom laying craft. However a mistaken order resulted in the Bombardons being placed in water some 20m to 24m deep rather than the designed 13m and they were strung out in a single line when there should have been a doublé line. The effectiveness ofthis outer barrier had been compromised. On D+1 the caissons, each with a 4 man crew, two sailors and an anti-aircraft gun emplacement, were towed to positions about a mile off-shore and handed over to a fleet of powerful harbour tugs which manoeuvred them into their final positions. The caissons' sea valves were opened until they settled at previously agreed depths. Each Mulberry was about a mile long and stood about 30 ft (9m) above sea level at low tide and 10 ft (3m) at high tide. The block-ships at Mulberry B were all in position by June 13th and formed two crescent shaped harbours which accommodated 75 Liberty ships and small craft. The installation of the stores and LST piers proved to be more of a problem. The tows began to arrive at Mulberry B on D+4 and work continued throughout the night. Choppy seas made the manoeuvring of the bridging spans very difficult. By D+8 the stores pier and roadway amounting to 1.2k was in place and operational. The 2nd stores pier was operational by July 8. It was later discovered that the Beetle floats to support the roadway had been positioned in an alternate pattern rather than opposite each other as the design intended. This proved to be a costly error when consequential stability problems were experienced. The Luftwaffe attacked Mulberry B on July 15 but such were the defences that 9 of the 12 Messcherschmitts were shot down. Mulberry A was in use for less than 10 days when it was severely damaged by the worst period of sustained severe weather for 40 years. Out of 31 caissons laid in position 21 were damaged beyond repair with broken backs and sides. Mulberry A was never used again and parts of it were scavenged to repair damage to Mulberry B. The Americans quickly reverted to the traditional methods of unioading from landing craft and DUKWs directly onto the beaches often coming in on one tide and leaving on the next. Such was their success that on occasions they exceeded the impressive performance achieved at Mulberry B. (Photos; HMLST 427 discharging her cargo onto Mulberry A prior to the storm.) Each day around 9000 tons were landed via Mulberry B until the end of August by which time Cherbourg port became available for use at least in part and, towards the end of the year, after the capture of Walcheren, the port ofAntwerp. Mulberry B was in use for 5 months during which time over 2 million men, half a million vehicles and 4 million tons of supplies passed through the harbour. During this period several additional caissons where used to reinforce weak points in the breakwater. The Mulberry project was for certain a great feat of engineering - a highly complex task completed in just 6 months of manufacture, by hundreds of contractors in dozens of locations, under wartime conditions and a serieus shortage of skilled labour. The planners were heavily influenced by the paramount need to secure the Allied supply line since the invasion would otherwise stall and collapse as the enemy regrouped and drew on their reserves. There are those who believe that Mulberry was unnecessary as exampled by the Americans success in landing supplies directly onto the beaches after the abandonment of Mulberry A. We'll never know, with any degree ofcertainty, what would have happened had Mulberry neverbeen built... and that for many is all the justification needed for the planners' decision to authorise the project. With the exception of those who were there in the summer of 1944, there is nothing in our collective experience that allows us to imagine the vastness of the operation and the absolute necessity to move men, supplies, munitions and equipment to the right place at the right time. Even the logistics faced by the largest supermarket chains today pale into insignificance when compared to the task faced by the planners in the early 1940s. They faced an awesome responsibility and the wider world faced dire consequences in the event of failure to deliver. The Supermarket scenario offers an opportunity to put the scale of the task into a modern context. It has been calculated that each serviceman needed 6.5lb (3Kg) per day to sustain him in the field. On this basislOOO men needed around 2.5 tons, 100,000 needed 250 tons and 1,000,000 2,500 tons per day!. As the size of the invading force grew so did the daily demand for supplies. Then there were the lorries, tanks, artillery pieces, ammunition, military field hospitals, mobile radar and communications units etc etc. all ofwhich had to be transported across the channel. Over 4,000 vessels plied the waters between the UK and Normandy from D-Day and the contribution of Mulberry B in speeding up the operation and securing the supply chain in adverse weather conditions, is beyond question. The majority of vessels in use were not capable of beach landings. After the war at the Nurembeurg trials, Albert Speer gave the enemy perspective on the Mulberry Harbours and theirAtlantic Wall defences. 'To construct our defences we had in two years used some 13 million cubic meters of concrete and 1.5 million tons of steel. A fortnight after the landings by the enemy, this costly effort was brought to nothing because of an idea of simple genius. As we know now, the invasion forces brought their own harbours, and built, at Arromanches and Omaha, on unprotected coast, the necessary landing ramps."